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On January 5 and 6, 1870, the new government of Meiji Japan began to deport an estimated three thousand Japa-nese Christians from Urakami Village, near Nagasaki, to 
other parts of Kyushu, in an event known as the Urakami kuzure 
(‘destruction’).1 !is was the culmination of Japan’s most signifi-
cant persecution of Christians in two hundred years, made all the 
more surprising in light of the presence of foreign representatives 
in the treaty port of Nagasaki and the apparent close interest taken 
in the subject by the Western consuls in Yokohama. It was indeed 
thought at the time that it was the constant clamor of protest taken 
up by the European and American diplomats in Yokohama and 
Nagasaki that finally halted the persecutions, and no Westerner 
was seemingly more active on behalf of the Christians than British 
Consul-General Harry S. Parkes. Parkes happened to be in Na-
gasaki when the deportation began and personally intervened on 
behalf of the Christians with local Japanese officials; he continually 
brought up the subject with high-ranking Japanese ministers while 
at the imperial court in Osaka, and in his correspondence with 
London regularly kept the Foreign Office informed of the course of 
anti-Christian activities.2 
Most of the available sources, then as now, are united in point-
ing to Western intervention as the major factor in the cessation of 
persecution, and in noting particularly the role of Parkes and the 
British. !is conclusion is partially the result of common sense: 
the British would be expected to take a strong interest in an at-
tack on Christianity, especially as their trade with Japan was at the 
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time significantly greater than that of any other Western power.3 
Closer examination, however, reveals that domestic factors, rather 
than British scrutiny, were most important in the termination of 
persecution. !e British were in Japan to trade, not to proselytize, 
and their chief aim was, by Harry Parkes’s own admission, the suc-
cess and stability of a friendly Japanese government. Knowing this 
to be the case, the Japanese were able to successfully manipulate 
Parkes and the other Western consuls in order to carry out their 
desired religious policy.
THE DESTRUCTION OF CHRISTIANITY IN JAPAN IN THE 
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
By the time of Japan’s official opening to the West in 1854, 
Christianity had been prohibited in the empire for nearly two hun-
dred fifty years, and the story of its suppression was relatively well 
known to Foreign Office officials.4 !e religion was introduced to 
Kyushu by St. Francis Xavier in 1549, and by the beginning of the 
seventeenth century had spread throughout that island as well as, 
to some extent, the main island of Honshu. Adherents included 
the daimyo5 of Omura, Arima, and Shimabara, and while Jesuit 
reports of more than six hundred thousand converts may be exag-
gerated, it is nevertheless clear that Christians comprised a signifi-
cant minority in the western han.6 !e dedicated ministrations of 
Jesuit priests were abetted by indirect support from contenders in 
Japan’s ongoing civil wars, most notably Oda Nobunaga, who at-
tacked the establishment Buddhist priesthood as part of his efforts 
to establish a new unified government.7 !is support came to an 
end after Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu succeeded in 
reestablishing central control. Ieyasu, in particular, was extremely 
hostile toward the Christian faith, and it was he who between 1612 
and 1614 banned the practice of the religion, ordered the expulsion 
of all Western priests, and authorized the destruction of Christian 
churches.8 !ose Jesuits not driven out were put to death, and the 
only significant act of native resistance, the Catholic rebellion at 
Shimabara, was crushed by 1636. Christianity remained officially 
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extinct in Japan for the next two centuries.9 
In trying to understand the mindset that stories of the seven-
teenth century persecutions produced in Parkes and his compatri-
ots, it is important to emphasize their unanimous agreement that 
the extermination of Christianity was, above all, the Jesuits’ own 
fault. To most nineteenth century Britons, the Jesuits were guilty of 
treasonously plotting to overthrow the Japanese government. Prot-
estant minister the Rev. Hamilton A. MacGill, writing to Foreign 
Secretary Lord Granville in 1870 to advocate a more forthright 
policy in defense of Christianity, admitted that he was “well aware 
that the crime and calamity of persecution against the Christian re-
ligion in Japan . . . were precipitated by the discovery that the Rom-
ish missionaries aimed at political as well as Christian results.”10 
British diplomats concurred: Harry Parkes (falsely) claimed that 
“the civil struggles of the commencement of the seventeenth cen-
tury”—meaning the wars by which the Tokugawa shogunate11 had 
been established—“were religious in their character.”12 Even histo-
rian J. J. Rein, while admitting that ”no support for [the] accusation” 
that Catholic priests were fomenting rebellion “can be found in the 
writings of the Jesuits,” nonetheless held that Ieyasu’s extermina-
tion of them was in some sense rational or justifiable.13 Ieyasu’s 
attack on Christianity was most likely caused by a need for sup-
port from the vehemently anti-Catholic Buddhist priesthood, and 
by suspicion of Christians for having largely sided with his rival 
Toyotomi Hideyori in the civil war, as much as by supposed Jesuit 
scheming. !e contextualization of the Tokugawa extermination 
of Christianity in British minds with anti-Catholic attitudes—it 
will be remembered that the anti-Catholic Test Act had been re-
pealed only in 1829, and it remained illegal for a Catholic to ascend 
the throne of Great Britain—was to have crucial ramifications dur-
ing the next major episode of persecution in Japan.14
Despite the intensity of shogunal repression of Christianity 
in the first half of the seventeenth century, some Christians man-
aged to survive. !ese so called hidden Christians (kakure kirishi-
tan) were able to preserve their beliefs using the traditional Bud-
dhist method of secret worship, onando buppo (itself developed 
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during periods of persecution of Buddhism). Christian villages 
would employ a secretary to keep the religious calendar, a “wa-
tering-man” to baptize infants, and a “hearing-man” to pass infor-
mation along to the believers, who would then worship in private 
houses without the knowledge of the authorities.15 Incredibly, this 
technique worked sufficiently well that when Catholic priests fi-
nally returned to Nagasaki in the early 1860s, they quickly discov-
ered the existence of several thousand Christian believers. Some of 
these refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the new ministers, 
but many others eagerly flocked to the French cathedral and sought 
instruction from the long-vanished keepers of the true faith.16
THE FIRST URAKAMI PERSECUTION, 1867
During the opening of the country in the 1850s, the shogun, 
under Western pressure, consented to the abolishment of the prac-
tice of fumi-e (by which Nagasaki residents were required to tram-
ple on Christian icons in order to prove they were not believers), 
but the harsh laws against practice of Christianity remained on the 
books. French priests were supposed to be in Nagasaki only to pro-
vide for the needs of the small foreign community, who under the 
treaties between Japan and the Western countries were permitted 
to engage in Christian worship.17 But, faced with the opportunity 
to contact survivors of one of the greatest Christian persecutions 
since Roman times, the priests proved unable to resist. "ey be-
gan to receive Japanese worshippers in their homes and travel to 
Christian villages, including Urakami, in order to preach and give 
Mass. Upon becoming aware of this proselytization, the shogunal 
governor of Nagasaki, Tokunaga Hisamasa, initially did not react. 
Following protests by the anti-Christian daimyo of Omura, how-
ever, the governor ordered the arrest of Urakami residents in July 
and August 1867. Altogether more than sixty were imprisoned.18  
 Parkes was aware of the arrests, as revealed in a later letter to 
the Foreign Secretary, Lord Stanley, and probably informed Lon-
don about them at the time.19 Parkes’s secretary, Ernest Satow, was 
in Nagasaki when the persecution began, and heard “a good deal” 
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about them from local officials. He notes that those imprisoned 
were threatened with capital punishment under Japanese law.20 Yet 
unlike the French, Prussian, Portuguese, and American consuls in 
Nagasaki, no British representative protested to the Japanese about 
the arrests.21 Satow merely advised a Japanese friend that “Eng-
land would not be pleased” to hear of the persecutions, and added 
that he would not object to the daimyo of Omura advocating more 
stringent attacks on Christians if their only aim was to embarrass 
the shogunate.22 "e French representative in Yokohama, Léon 
Roches, was by contrast hyperactive in the defense of the Japanese 
Christians. He personally petitioned the Shogun for the prisoners’ 
release, which seems to have hastened the end of the persecution 
in October 1867.23 On the American side, meanwhile, the Secre-
tary of State William Seward was interested enough in the matter 
to cable American Consul Van Valkenburgh encouraging him to 
cooperate with the other representatives in the moderation of the 
anti-Christian laws.24 
In Britain itself, meanwhile, the Urakami incident was barely 
reported. Only the Birmingham Daily Post, of the dozens of sources 
examined, carried a story on it; an October 5, 1867 article that re-
lates the discovery of the Christians by Catholic priests in greater 
detail than their persecution. It even claimed that “all the Consuls 
[sic] have been to the Emperor, and he is much embarrassed,” sug-
gesting that most Britons were unaware of the inactivity on the 
part of their representatives in Japan.25 "e more frequent reports 
of the later Urakami incidents after the Meiji Restoration do not 
display any awareness of the persecutions of July and August 1867. 
Why was there such apathy of the key British players in Ja-
pan—Parkes, Satow, Parkes’s other secretary A. Bertram Mitford, 
and Nagasaki consul Marcus Flowers—during the last shogunal 
persecution of Christians, given the interest taken in the matter 
by all the other foreign representatives? "e records suggest that 
a number of circumstantial factors reduced British willingness to 
protest to the Japanese government of the time. For one, Parkes was 
more concerned with the recent murder in Nagasaki of two British 
sailors from the HMS Icarus. "e Japanese official to whom French 
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Nagasaki consul M. Lèques protested about the Christian persecu-
tion had in fact been sent to the city by the shogun to investigate 
the British case.26 For another, the very groups advocating more 
stringent action against the Urakami Christians—the daimyo of 
Omura and Satsuma, local Nagasaki officials—were allied with the 
Emperor, who the British were inclined to support in the looming 
civil war between Emperor and Shogun. Satow openly supported 
the western daimyo against the shogun and and explicitly wrote in 
his memoirs that he tolerated the Kyushu officials’ hostility toward 
Christians insofar as it was “of course intended as a general mani-
festo against the Shogun’s government.”27 "e success of French 
Minister Roches, whose policy in Japan was one of coziness with 
the shogunal government, in obtaining the Christians’ release re-
veals how closely protests on behalf of native Christians were tied 
up with local politics and intra-European power rivalries in the Far 
East.28
THE MEIJI RESTORATION AND REVIVAL SHINTO
Shortly after the release of the imprisoned Urakami Chris-
tians, in January 1868, the shogunate was overthrown. Samurai 
from the western han of Choshu and Satsuma rallied around the 
Emperor, seized Osaka, and effected the last Tokugawa shogun’s 
submission to imperial rule. "is event, though it enabled the ad-
vance of modern science and economics, was to have dark implica-
tions for the Christians around Nagasaki. "e new oligarchs who 
surrounded the young Meiji Emperor knew that their position was 
precarious; they represented the same faction geographically that 
had fallen before Tokugawa Ieyasu at Sekigahara in 1600, and even 
their dramatic early success in the civil war did not give them con-
trol of Edo (modern Tokyo) or the northern han, which remained 
in the hands of Tokugawa retainers. "e crumbling of the shogun’s 
rule did not automatically give the new rulers a power base of their 
own. In order to create a new basis of support for control over to 
the country, the Meiji oligarchs turned to religious institutional-
ization—just as Ieyasu had—in this case by rallying around the 
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semi-mythical figure of the Emperor and proclaiming the reestab-
lishment of the ancient Shinto rites.29  
!is in itself almost constituted a revolution, as Buddhism, 
not Shinto, had been patronized by the Tokugawas. Shinto as it ex-
isted in Japan by 1868 was less a separate religion than a syncretis-
tic mix of Buddhist ceremonies and older, traditional practices and 
beliefs. To divide the two, as the Revival Shinto scholars surround-
ing the Emperor now proposed to do, required less a ”restoration” 
than the creation of an entirely new religious system. Yet on April 
4, 1868—even before the promulgation of the famous Charter 
Oath outlining the aims of the new government—came the order 
for Buddhist monks to return to secular life, and a few days later for 
the removal of Buddhist objects from Shinto temples and the re-
naming of Shinto temples that had Buddhist names. !ese orders 
were issued by the Department for Shinto (Jingimuka), which, un-
der the initial Meiji system of rule, supposedly ranked even higher 
than the executive arm of the imperial government (Dajokan).30 
!ere followed a widespread outbreak of disorder in which groups 
of hooligans torched Buddhist temples and assaulted priests. !is 
persecution of Buddhism indirectly furthered hostility toward 
Christianity because Buddhist priests, desperate to escape official 
disfavor, became the loudest voices in condemning the influence of 
the foreign sect.31 Moreover, rather than being an isolated incident 
as it had been under the bakufu, the persecution of Christians at 
Urakami was now part of a pattern of state hostility toward any 
non-Shinto religion, which helps explain why the Urakami perse-
cution of the Meiji period was so much more severe than its pre-
cursor.
Despite the dramatic changes in Japan’s religious policy after 
1868, there is no evidence in the records that the British were espe-
cially concerned by the contemporary attacks on Buddhism, much 
less that they drew any connection between it and the government’s 
hostility toward Christians. !e only near-contemporary reference 
is in F. V. Dickins’s biography of Harry Parkes, which makes pass-
ing reference to “the abolition of Buddhism in Satsuma,” but adds 
that it “was accepted, without a murmur, even by the Buddhist 
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priests themselves,” and only ten pages later arrives at the attacks 
on Urakami Christians.32
Only three days after the decree against Buddhism, the Da-
jokan decided to repost throughout the empire the triple-edict 
boards33 condemning Christianity, and notified Westerners to that 
effect through its officially published gazette. #is time, the British 
minister did protest against the anti-Christian policy, although not 
before the minister from the United States had done so.34 Parkes 
reported to Lord Stanley his remonstrances concerning the triple 
edict in a dispatch dated May 30, 1868. He explained that he spoke 
informally on the matter to de facto foreign minister Date Mun-
enari35 and two other high officials, emphasizing to them that the 
effort to “bring about a good understanding between foreign na-
tions and Japan, might be entirely defeated if the Mikado’s Gov-
ernment declared itself actively hostile to the faith which all the 
nations having Treaty relations with Japan professed.”36 He also 
reported, however, that he convinced the representatives of France, 
Holland, Italy, Prussia, and the United States not to send letters of 
protest to the Japanese ministers at Yokohama, and included trans-
lations of the new edict to determine if it “compares favourably with 
that of the old Government.”37 It is evident from the very begin-
ning of news of fresh Japanese undertakings against Christians that 
Parkes took a far milder approach in the Christians’ defense than 
that to which his colleagues, particularly the French and American 
consuls, were inclined. He cannot have felt too strongly about the 
threat of persecution, as his dispatch declined to substantiate ru-
mors of new imprisonments around Nagasaki, and was written on 
the same day (May 30) that he sent off a report to Lord Stanley on 
the Japanese celebration of Queen Victoria’s birthday.38   
THE SECOND URAKAMI PERSECUTION, 1868–1873
#ough Parkes as of May 30 thought that “the threatened 
persecution had not then set in,” hostile action against the Chris-
tians of Nagasaki had in fat been ongoing for several months.39 
#e Meiji government established itself in Kyushu in February 
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1868, and at the end of that month appointed Sawa Nobuyoshi, 
a staunch nationalist and dedicated opponent of the Shogun—he 
had spent five years in exile in Choshu following a failed 1863 coup 
attempt—governor of Nagasaki. He and his staff were opposed to 
Western influence in Japan, dedicated supporters of the govern-
ment’s religious policy, and more hostile to Christianity than the 
Emperor or his ministers. "ey found on their March 1868 arrival 
in Nagasaki that most of the local officials, having been restrained 
from their earlier eagerness to crush the Urakami Christians by the 
orders of the Shogun, shared their enthusiasm for a fresh persecu-
tion. On March 14, 1868 came the arrest warrant for Christian 
leaders in Urakami village.40 "ere is little evidence that the Brit-
ish were aware of these measures, arising not from the central gov-
ernment but from local officials supporting the broader aims of the 
Meiji Revival Shinto policy. "ere are no reports in British news-
papers of any Urakami persecutions before October 1868, and the 
mere “rumors” that Parkes ascribed to Nagasaki consul Flowers at 
the end of May were apparently only “several days” old.41 By that 
point, however, arrests were well underway, and the Dajokan had 
discussed the issue nearly a month earlier (on April 25, 1868).42 
After submitting its infamous decree ordering the dispersal 
of 4,010 Christians throughout the western han ( June 7, 1868), 
the Dajokan waited several months before taking action, which sug-
gests its awareness that attacking the Western religion would have 
a negative impact on the government’s foreign relations.43 "at it 
felt it could nevertheless get away with issuing the decree in the first 
place testifies to the perception, even on the part of the Japanese, 
of the relative apathy toward Christianity of the country’s largest 
trading partner. "e French, stalwart defenders of the Catholics 
around Nagasaki, had fallen out of favor due to their support of 
the floundering shogunate; the British, who had at the very least 
observed a highly benign neutrality that aided the imperial forces, 
were evidently not thought to care as much about what the Japa-
nese did to their Christians.44 "ey were, after all, hardly unaware 
that the anti-shogunal forces in the western han also tended to 
be those that were most hostile to Westerners and Christianity; 
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Parkes makes regular referrals, even in his earliest dispatches on 
the subject, to the need of the Meiji oligarchs to show some degree 
of unfriendliness toward Christianity in order to appease the more 
rabid nationalists in their midst.45 Even Consul Flowers, generally 
more eager to intervene in favor of the Urakami Christians than his 
superior in Yokohama, recorded in a July 1868 letter to Parkes the 
feelings of an official in Nagasaki that “it was not so much against 
Christianity they were acting, as to preserve order in the country.”46 
Upon first learning of the plans for exile of native Christians 
in June 1868, Parkes wrote to Lord Stanley expressing his opinion 
that the decree was the result of “the anti-foreign party [having] 
propose[d] to make Christian proselytism a source for hostility to 
foreigners.”47 Although explaining that those affected “may be con-
demned to capital punishment,” he did not record any protest on 
his part to the Japanese against such treatment, and in the dispatch 
merely expressed the hope “that the conduct of foreign missionar-
ies at this juncture will not increase the agitation.”48 #is is a re-
markably tepid response to the threat of a massacre of Christian 
believers, and Parkes’s instinctive reaction to blame “the conduct of 
foreign missionaries” rather than the Japanese authorities is consis-
tent with his attitude throughout the Christian persecutions. One 
month later, apparently forced to make some remonstration to 
the Japanese government by the demands of the other Yokohama 
ministers and the joint protest of the French, British, Portuguese, 
Dutch, and American resident consuls in Nagasaki, Parkes wrote 
to Lord Stanley that it was “satisfactory” to be told by foreign affairs 
advisor Date Munenari that “the decree under which upwards of 
four thousand native Christians were sentenced to banishment, has 
as yet been enforced in this case only of one hundred twenty.’49 He 
again blamed the conduct of the Catholic missionaries in Urakami 
for the difficulty of the persecution.50
In August 1868, the desire of the French minister in Japan, 
Léon Roches, to submit a note signed by all the consuls to the im-
perial government protesting the deportation of Christians from 
Urakami prompted a remarkable and lengthy dispatch from Parkes 
to Lord Stanley offering a qualified defense of the anti-Christian 
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policy. He told the Foreign Secretary that he immediately rejected 
the idea of a joint protest, and convinced the representatives of the 
United States, Holland, Italy, and Prussia to refrain from one. For 
his reasoning he cited “the excited state of the country” and that 
“no extreme penalty . . . has yet been inflicted on the converts,” and 
repeated Munenari’s “the sentence of banishment . . . which appears 
to have passed upon four thousand persons, has yet been carried 
out in the case of 120 only.”51 Parkes improbably argued that “the 
decree itself is not conceived in a tone of rigid intolerance” and here 
made his reference to the delicacy of Christian relations in Japan 
due to the supposedly religious character of the Sengoku jidai.52 
He emphasized that “the present Mikado’s Government cannot 
be held responsible” for antagonism toward Christians, and even 
went so far as to impugn the standing of the Christians themselves, 
wondering “whether the objections to their conduct can be said to 
be confined solely to their religious professions” and noting that “in 
a printed account of the arrest of the Christians in the summer of 
last year . . . it is stated that they opposed the police sent to arrest 
them.”53 Parkes concluded to Lord Stanley that he intended to “lose 
no opportunity of impressing upon influential members of the Mi-
kado’s Government” the need for a friendlier policy with regard to 
Christianity, but would not issue formal protests of the sort desired 
by the French minister (and which had proved effective during the 
last persecution under the shogunate), feeling that “much more can 
be urged on these and similar points in friendly conversation than 
in a formal note.”54 If the Foreign Office records can be assumed 
complete, this is Parkes’s last dispatch to the Foreign Secretary on 
the subject of Japanese Christians until November 1872. 
Regardless of arguments relating to its expediency, Parkes’s 
complacency on the subject of Christian persecution is astonishing. 
His own adjectival summary, “friendly,” is an apt one, echoed by all 
the British diplomats in records of their remonstrations with the 
Japanese. A. Bertram Mitford, in a May 28, 1868 letter to Harry 
Parkes from Osaka, noted approvingly in conversation with the 
Prince of Uwajima55 (Date Munenari) that the prince “appeared 
to attach great importance to the opinions expressed,” even though 
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“he could not pledge himself in any way to rescue the prisoners 
from their fate.”56 In another letter Mitford explained that the Jap-
anese kindly “do not profess to deny the excellence of the Christian 
teaching,” as if this made their persecution of it less offensive. In the 
same letter he cited the Taiping rebellion, “founded on a few Chris-
tian tracts,” as apparent justification for the suppression of the re-
ligion.57 "e Foreign Secretary himself, in a July 1868 dispatch to 
Parkes in Japan, wrote that “the evidence of these despatches of the 
generally friendly disposition of the Japanese Government is highly 
satisfactory,” even though he was replying to Parkes’s first reference 
to the anti-Christian edict of  May 30! When he instructed Parkes 
to act against the “obnoxious edict respecting Christianity,” he told 
him only to pressure the Japanese government to revoke the edict 
“in a friendly way.”58 "ese are all remarkably sanguine stances for 
a British government to take regarding the explicit persecution of 
its state religion. 
BRITISH VIEWS ON THE PERSECUTIONS
"e demonstrated willingness of British officials, in Japan 
and at home, to extenuate Japanese maltreatment of the Urakami 
Christians requires some explanation. In the first place, it must be 
admitted Japan’s treaties with the West did not give Parkes legal 
authority to intervene in its policies toward Christians. "e reli-
gious freedom clauses of the American, Dutch, Russian, British, 
and French treaties of amity and commerce signed with the Jap-
anese in 1858 only read that neither party should meddle in the 
other’s religious affairs. "ose missionaries that were present in the 
empire were supposed to operate only in the treaty ports for the 
benefit of lapsed foreign believers, rather than for Japanese con-
verts.59 However, this did not prevent Léon Roches from speaking 
to the Shogun on behalf of Christian converts in 1867, and there 
was nothing illegal about applying something more than merely 
“friendly” pressure on the Japanese government to stop imprison-
ing its Christians or threatening them with execution. Had Parkes 
cared to speak more emphatically on the subject, there would have 
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been nothing to prevent him doing so.60 
Furthermore, that a certain degree of apathy toward Japan’s 
treatment of its Christians was shared by both government offi-
cials and the British press suggests that more than institutional or 
legal factors were at work. "e opinions of some scholars on this 
subject—namely, that the British public was well informed of and 
highly angered by the Urakami persecutions, and that hostility to-
ward Japan created by news of the persecutions was a major fac-
tor in the failure of the Iwakura mission—do not bear scrutiny.61 
Discussion of Japan in Parliament or the British press was rare in 
the early years of British involvement there (1858–83); of Japa-
nese persecution of Christians, rarer still. In the London Times, 
for example, months if not years could pass between mentions of 
the country.62 One of the mere three reports carried by the Times 
on Urakami between 1870 and 1872 refuted an earlier article, 
of March 6, 1872, describing torture and crucifixion of Japanese 
Christians, on the basis of inaccuracy.63 Another article on the 
persecution, in the London Pall Mall Gazette of March 16, 1872, 
declined to publish accounts from the Nagasaki Gazette because “it 
seems that the paper in question is under the influence of Roman 
Catholic priests at Nagasaki.”64 Most of the other published stories 
on Japanese attacks on Christianity fell along similar lines, although 
they were less overtly anti-Catholic. "ey were universally short, 
and tended to be sandwiched between longer articles on different 
(often mundane) subjects, or combined with other information on 
Japan of a less inflammatory nature.65 Often they placed rumors 
of persecution in Japan and China within the same article.66 In 
all the accounts, details were slight (scarcely better than hearsay), 
and because of the time involved in between Nagasaki and Britain, 
the news was published many months after the events described.67 
While there is not space here for an exhaustive survey of articles in 
the British press on Japanese persecution of Christians, the trend 
of general disinterest is clear.68  
Nor, in contrast to what might be expected, were the mission-
ary societies in Britain a very effective pressure group in urging the 
Foreign Office to intervene more strongly on behalf of the Urakami 
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Christians. !e Methodist “General Religious Intelligence” of No-
vember 1870 included a copy of a report by the Nagasaki Shipping 
List on the subject of persecution, but noted that such Western 
missionaries as were employed by the Japanese government “are 
left almost entirely untrammeled in regard to what they teach.”69 
!e official appeal to the Foreign Office by the United Presbyte-
rian Church’s Board of Missions only tried to impress upon Lord 
Granville (who became Foreign Secretary in July 1870) the vague 
“importance of securing the full toleration of Christianity” in the 
future.70 !e church delegation—from the Council of the Evan-
gelical Alliance and British Missionary Societies—sent to the For-
eign Secretary to remonstrate on the matter during the Iwakura 
Embassy’s sojourn in Britain was met by Harry Parkes himself, 
then on leave, convinced of the fairness of the Japan’s government’s 
position, and persuaded that force should not be used to stop Japa-
nese hostility toward native Christians even if this impeded evan-
gelization in the country.71 In short, the attitude of the evangelical 
societies in Britain was similar to (and often directly informed by) 
that of the Foreign Office.
In addition to the great distance involved and lack of good re-
ports, much of the apathy amongst British Christians must be due 
to the very small numbers of Protestant missionaries and converts 
in Japan at the time. No significant British Protestant missionary 
activity took place in Japan before 1873. !e first English mission-
ary of any kind, one George Ensor, an Anglican minister from Lon-
don, reached Nagasaki only in January 1869 and did not baptize 
his first convert until April 1869. He may have pressed Parkes and 
Flowers for a more active defense of the Urakami Christians, but 
he himself was concerned about the proselytizing of his French 
Catholic rivals. Ensor was the only British churchman in Japan 
until 1871.72 !at the persecutions at Urakami touched neither 
Western missionaries—whose preaching the Japanese scrupu-
lously avoided noticing, even to the extent of allowing them to es-
cape police raids—nor Protestant converts (of whom there were 
still only ten in 1872, scattered between Nagasaki and Yokohama) 
surely explains to a great extent the lack of close attention paid to 
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the Urakami incidents in Britain.73 !is is made even more appar-
ent when one considers that the much closer interest in the perse-
cutions by the United States and especially France were probably 
the result of the presence of a much greater number of missionaries 
from both countries and, in the case of the French, the involve-
ment of co-religionists.74 !e Catholicism of the priests and their 
converts seems to have played into rampant British suspicions of 
Catholic unscrupulousness well into the nineteenth century. In the 
writings of Parkes, Mitford, and Flowers, as well as in the British 
press, suggestions that French Catholic rapacity for converts irre-
sponsibly provoked the persecutions, that the priests were delib-
erately flouting the laws of the Japanese government, and that the 
priests were, in any sense, following in the steps of their Jesuit fore-
bears in plotting something vile against the rulers of Japan, are all 
consistent explicit or underlying themes.75 Mitford, in particular, 
declared the priests to “have preached sedition and treason.”76
!ere was also, it must be said, general suspicion on the part 
of the skeptical British officials in Japan that the Urakami Chris-
tians were not the saintly, miraculous survivors of ancient perse-
cution that the French priests presented.77 In addition to the 
fairly self-serving argument by Harry Parkes that the Christians 
may have attacked police officers sent to arrest them, British re-
ports gradually suggest as the persecutions went on that the very 
identity of the Urakami residents as Christians was under ques-
tion.78 Mitford recorded without comment the contentions of 
Japanese elites that “the school of Urakami is but a bastard form 
of Christianity,” and that the “converts have but little in common 
with true Christians.”79 In fact, the hidden Christians had, in their 
centuries of hiding, created a syncretistic religion of the sort com-
mon in Japanese history, which combined a Christian framework 
with elements of traditional Japanese ritual. St. John the Baptist 
was viewed as a water-god, St. Francis of Assisi a wind god. !ese 
unorthodoxies proved difficult for even the French priests to root 
out.80 It is not entirely surprising that the British refrained from 
raising much alarm in support of a bastardized form of Catholi-
cism, especially when the Japanese did not harass native Protestant 
165Journal of Politics & Society
converts. !e latter also tended to be of a higher social class than 
the largely peasant Urakami Christians, with whom the British had 
no opportunity for regular contact.81
But all that the above proves is that there was less public 
pressure upon Harry Parkes to do something about the attacks 
on Christians than there was upon his French and American col-
leagues. He was still free to act if he had cared to do so. !at he did 
not is—perhaps—partially due to his own lack of religious fervor, 
but more directly due to his understanding of his purpose in Ja-
pan.82 Parkes was not a missionary, but a resident representative of 
the British Empire, the perceived ambition of which was—in the 
words of historian Ronald Hyam—to “organis[e] the entire world 
for the purpose of satisfying the needs of the expanding British 
economy.”83 His position more than anything impelled him to su-
pervise and encourage British trade with Japan.84 All other con-
cerns were secondary to that end, and its attendant requirement: 
a stable, friendly Japanese government. Parkes was unwilling to 
pressure the Japanese government on the subject of Christianity if 
doing so would weaken its standing in the country—his dispatches 
on the progress of the civil war, which are longer and more frequent 
than those on the Urakami persecutions, indicate that he was well 
aware of the uncertain position of the Meiji oligarchs—or result 
in Japanese resentment toward Britain.85 He knew that France’s 
assertiveness on the Christian matter had, by irritating those Japa-
nese opposed to foreign influence, returned to haunt them after 
the collapse of the bakufu.86 Parkes may even have deliberately 
taken a softer stance than that of Britain’s colonial rival, France, in 
order to gain more influence over the Meiji government: sources 
on the persecutions tend to present all the European powers act-
ing in concert against Japan, or as part of a group led by Parkes, 
but intra-European competition persisted overseas as much as it 
did on the continent in the era of New Imperialism.87 While act-
ing in defense of the Urakami Christians to the extent required 
in order to forestall potential criticism in Britain, Parkes hardly 
considered spreading the faith to be part of his mandate, and was 
more concerned with containing an incident that could negatively 
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impact trade than he was with keeping the Japanese from impris-
oning their own citizens. As the various British Prime Ministers 
and Foreign Secretaries of the period were not terribly interested 
in the distant outposts in Japan—worth much less to Britain than 
the concessions in China—they gave Parkes very wide authority to 
make decisions on his own: Lord Granville’s instructions to Parkes 
on his 1873 return to Japan following home leave explained that 
“Her Majesty’s Government fully rely on your ability to judge what 
the interests of British subjects require.”88  Policy thus tended to 
be determined in Yokohama and approved in London only later. 
Parkes’s disinclination—driven by trade concerns—to prod the 
Japanese on the issue became the chief factor in Britain’s lackluster 
response to the Urakami incidents. 
JAPANESE STRATEGY TOWARD THE BRITISH
!e Japanese were not simply lucky in being handed a British 
minister who did not care to cross them on a matter far from his 
heart. Particularly between 1868 and 1870, they were determined 
to persecute the Urakami Christians as part of the policy of Revival 
Shinto and skillfully handled the foreign consuls in order to be able 
to do so. !e month and a half that the government spent deliber-
ating before issuing the deportation decree shows that the Japanese 
were not blithely unaware that attacks on Catholic converts might 
antagonize Western governments. !ey were careful to employ 
claims and methods that would placate the foreign representatives 
even as support for Revival Shinto helped quiet ultranationalist 
critics. For example, in response to the July 1868 protests by the Yo-
kohama consuls to the de facto Japanese minister for foreign affairs, 
the minister Date Munenari blamed local officials in Nagasaki for 
a policy that had been sanctioned by Dajokan decree and promised 
to personally intervene to stop their excesses. He did not, of course, 
do so.89 !e August 7, 1868 Dajokan order postponing the exile 
of the remaining Urakami Christians, following the deportation of 
the first hundred-twenty, of which Harry Parkes made so much in 
his dispatches to the Foreign Office, was in fact sent out because the 
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rebellion by former bakufu admiral Enomoto Takeaki in Hokkaido 
had made it impossible for the authorities to transport the remain-
ing three thousand some Christians. As soon as the rebellion had 
ended in June 1869, the deportations resumed.90 By that point, 
however, Parkes had already obtained approval from the Foreign 
Office to pursue a very mild course in the hopes of influencing the 
Japanese government to alleviate its treatment. It took six months 
before the consuls succeeded in obtaining a meeting with the chief 
Japanese ministers. At that meeting the ministers (including future 
ambassador Iwakura Tonomi) improbably managed to convince 
the foreigners that the persecutions were their fault, because the 
Catholic missionaries’ ministrations to native Japanese had been in 
violation of the 1858 treaties. No official protests were made. In-
stead, on February 9, 1870, Western missionaries were instructed 
by the combined foreign powers to restrict their activities to foreign 
zones within the treaty ports.91 At around the same time, in March 
1870, the subject of the Urakami persecutions was brought up for 
the only time in the British Parliament, and the public was molli-
fied by Parkes’ presentation of the Japanese position.92 
In their conversations with Parkes and his secretaries, the Jap-
anese demonstrated a clear awareness of the British minister’s desire 
to find sympathy for their position. "e views Parkes and Mitford 
ascribed to Japanese officials were echoed again and again: “he laid 
great stress upon the difficult position in which the Japanese Gov-
ernment found themselves”; “it is remarkable how little sympathy 
these people [Christians] find with any class of their countrymen”; 
“they felt themselves deterred by a fear of consequences from advis-
ing toleration of the open profession of the Christian religion.”93 
By expressing a (partially sincere) belief that they were persecuting 
Christianity due to popular demand, the Japanese knew that they 
could bring the British, wary of doing anything that might desta-
bilize a government they favored, on board with their Shinto Re-
vival policies. "ey successfully gambled that British concern over 
hostility toward their religion would be outweighed by a desire to 
support the Meiji government and embarrass the French. 
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END OF THE PERSECUTIONS
Having succeeded in playing off both the Western powers and 
native extremists, however, the Meiji government began to bring 
the campaign against the Christians of Urakami to a halt. After 
February 1870 there were no more deportations.94 "e Japanese 
kept their promise to Parkes to send officials to the han to which 
the Christians had been deported in order to monitor their treat-
ment, and permitted the British to do the same. In June 1871 this 
even led to a public reprimand for some officials in the Kaga han 
who had been overzealous in their brutalization of the Urakami 
exiles.95 At around the same time, the Shinto Revival movement 
that was a major impetus for the Urakami persecutions began to 
wind down. "e government had by this time defeated most of its 
internal enemies and successfully imposed central rule from Edo; it 
no longer needed the support of the revolutionary Shinto priests, 
who in the event were generally less successful than their Buddhist 
predecessors in drumming up support for the government among 
the population.96 "e gradual trend toward de-emphasis of na-
tionalist religious rhetoric is hinted at in the evolution of the names 
of the religion department, from the Jingikan (“Office for Shinto”) 
in 1868, to the Jingisho (“Ministry of the Shinto Religion”) in 1871, 
to the more innocuous Kyobusho (“Ministry of Religion”) in 1872. 
At the last date, authority for Shinto temples was also transferred 
from the important Ministries of Civil Affairs and of Finance, 
where it had formerly resided as evidence of state support for Re-
vival Shinto.97 "e decision to end the persecution of Buddhism 
was made in 1873, the same year as the Urakami Christians were 
allowed to return to their homes.98 Parkes was lionized back home 
and in many subsequent publications for having ensured their re-
lease; yet the mortality rate among the returning Christians was 
about 17 percent.99
Frequently pointed to as a cause for the end of the harassment 
of Japanese Christians is the experience of the Japanese ambassa-
dors of the Iwakura mission as they traveled the world in 1871 and 
1872. It does seem that the U.S. Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, 
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used the Urakami persecutions as one of his many excuses for not 
then signing on to the plan for treaty revision with the Iwakura 
ambassadors.100 It is also true that the matter was twice brought 
up by Foreign Secretary Lord Granville in his three meetings with 
Iwakura, and that the Embassy included several men, including 
Iwakura himself, who, once fervent opponents of the Christians, 
adopted more tolerant views after their travels in the West.101 Most 
dramatically, Ito Hirobumi, having returned to Japan in June 1872 
from the United States to obtain higher diplomatic credentials, ad-
dressed a cabinet meeting in the Emperor’s presence to advocate 
benign treatment of Christians in order to obtain revised treaties 
with the West.102 But the claim that the end of Japanese persecu-
tion of Christianity came as a direct or sole result of the treatment 
of the Iwakura mission does not hold water. Lord Granville did 
twice ask Iwakura about the Japanese government’s treatment of its 
Christian subjects, but in the context of much longer discussions 
on other issues—the third meeting between the two dealt almost 
entirely with the Shimonoseki indemnity—and, as shown, he was 
very willing to use Parkes’s testimony to mollify any direct pressure 
on himself or Japan from British Christian groups.103 Freedom 
of religion was not included among the twelve points outlined by 
Parkes for Lord Granville in November 1872 as prerequisites for 
any revision of the 1858 treaty with the Japanese. He did refer to 
it in an addendum, but only to say that the Japanese government 
had not at the time shown any inclination to cease persecuting its 
Christian subjects.104 !e large protests reported by some sources 
for better treatment of Christians following the arrival of the Em-
bassy in London are not substantiated by any contemporary Brit-
ish news reports, nor by  Kume Kunitake’s (admittedly sanitized) 
account of the Embassy’s travels in Britain.105 On the contrary, it 
would appear that the Embassy was well received in Britain, and 
the press reports that do exist tend to extol the achievements of the 
Meiji Restoration and the heroism of the ambassadors.106 While 
Kume’s description of the Embassy’s travels and the improved 
opinion of Embassy members regarding Christianity do suggest 
that the Embassy’s travels had some effect on its members’ person-
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al opinions on the faith, these were in line with the general trend 
toward ending Christian persecution evident in Japan, and by the 
time the mission returned home in late 1873, the important deci-
sions had already been made.107
EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION
!e return home of the Urakami Christians in June 1873 
and the removal of the triple-edict boards in February 1873 did 
not officially legalize Christianity in Japan. Indeed, the Japanese 
claimed that they had removed the boards only because the edicts 
were by that time so well known to the people as to make their 
publication unnecessary.108 Sporadic persecutions continued, with 
less frequency and intensity, until the promulgation of the Meiji 
Constitution in 1889, and even that granted freedom of religious 
belief only “within limits not prejudicial to peace and order.”109 
Complete religious freedom in Japan did not come until after the 
Second World War.110 Moreover, the end of official persecution of 
Christianity did not result in a sudden wave of Christian converts. 
By 1885, there were only eleven thousand Protestant Christians in 
Japan, perhaps twice that number of Catholic converts, and an un-
known but not substantial number of Hidden Christians, in a total 
population of about thirty four million.111 To the irritation of the 
missionaries, many young Japanese feigned an interest in Christi-
anity in order to learn English,112 or for the entertainment value of 
Christian sermons as was recorded by Meiji convert to Christianity 
Uchimura Kanzo.113
In his memoirs, Uchimura explains that he was transiently 
interested in Christianity because of “its music, its stories, [and] 
the kindness shown me by its followers,” but hesitated to convert 
because of its “stringent laws” and status as the once-proscribed “evil 
sect.” While in his case these objections were eventually overcome, 
many another young Japanese was unwilling to become “a traitor to 
[his] country, and an apostate from [his] national faith by accepting 
a faith which is exotic in origin.”114
!e Meiji government ceased persecuting Christians in the 
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1870s as part of a broader movement of “civilization and enlight-
enment” (bunmei kaika), in which Japan tried to reconstruct itself 
on the model of the advanced Western countries. Enthusiasm for 
this policy among the oligarchs began to slacken in the 1880s and 
1890s due to the emergence of the People’s Rights movement and 
other democratic forces, often abetted by Christian converts. Con-
cerned at losing control over the population, toward the end of the 
century the government began again to promote the old Confucian 
and Shinto elements of Japanese tradition, which stressed respect 
for the Emperor and the rulers of the country.115 Buddhist lead-
ers, meanwhile, continued their vehement intellectual attacks on 
Christians in an effort to restore themselves to the authorities’ good 
graces. Uchimura Kanzo was himself famously condemned in 1891 
and forced to resign as an educator for paying insufficient homage 
to the Imperial Rescript on Education, a case that was taken as a 
sign of increased disfavor toward Christianity.116 By the outbreak 
of the Russo-Japanese War, the prominent Japanese Christians 
were generally those who supported the government and conser-
vative strains within Japanese society. Buddhist priests Kuroda 
Shindo and Maeda Eun joined with Honda Yoichi and Kozaki 
Hiromichi, both Christians, and Shinto scholar Shibata Reiichi 
in a May 1904 Religionists’ Meeting in Tokyo that tried to justify 
Japan’s war aims against Russia.117 More revolutionary Christians, 
such as Ueki Emori, had by then, disillusioned, generally reconciled 
to Buddhism.118 #us, the “large hopes” written of by the Rev. W. 
Fleming Stevenson and other British Christian leaders regarding a 
“Christian conquest” of Japan were to be disappointed. To this day, 
Christians comprise a tiny proportion of the Japanese population: 
at the last census, around three million out of a total population of 
127 million, or about 2 percent.119
It would thus appear that the traditional narrative of the 
1867–1873 Urakami incidents is inadequate in several respects. 
#e old story does not adequately account for the internal tensions 
that prompted the first Christian persecutions. Nor does it explain 
the very surprising degree of tolerance and understanding exhibited 
by the British when faced with the persecution of members of their 
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own religion, especially when compared with the wrath and horror 
that followed the Japanese extermination of Christianity in the sev-
enteenth century.120 !ough part of the more tepid response must 
of course be accounted for in the much smaller number of perse-
cuted, the difference in British attitude cannot solely be ascribed 
to a difference of scale. Trade concerns and the overarching policy 
goal of a stable, pro-British Japanese government caused Parkes to 
combat the persecutions with as little vigor as possible, encouraged 
by the absence of significant interest and latent anti-Catholicism 
back home. Moreover, while the traditional narrative presents the 
case of Urakami as a British victory over “Japanese jealousy and big-
otry,” closer examination reveals that the Japanese did not end the 
persecutions until they had satisfied their domestic aims, and deftly 
played off the (relatively unenthusiastic) Western objections before 
that time.121 Far from another instance of Oriental defeat in the 
power struggles of the nineteenth century, the Urakami incidents 
were actually an occasion on which the Japanese outmaneuvered 
the Europeans and Americans. !ey negotiated Western demands 
for religious toleration in such a fashion as to be able to satisfy do-
mestic opponents and eventually avoid any sweeping occurrence of 
proselytization. !e Urakami persecutions are, like Commodore 
Perry’s 1854 arrival in Edo Bay, an occasion on which an Oriental-
izing narrative of Western victory over weak or duplicitous East-
erners proves insufficient.122 
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